eneral Pemberton awoke that morning with no clear intention of what to do with his army.  Originally, he had planned to try and hit Grant's supply lines to the south, possibly forcing the Union general to abandon his campaign in the Mississippi interior for want of supplies.  But events of the morning of the 16th would drastically alter Pemberton's plans.  First, around seven o'clock, advanced Confederate cavalry patrols spotted and fired upon a Union column bearing down the Raymond Road near the Turkey Creek bridge.  After a brief fire fight, the Union advance halted. Although significant because it was evidence that the Federals were moving westward, toward Vicksburg, Pemberton stayed with his original plan until he received an intercept from his immediate superior, Joseph E. Johnston.  Johnston's telegram outlined a plan for Pemberton to link up with him near Clinton and consolidate their forces for a possible joint maneuver against Grant.  After a brief delay, Pemberton began ordering his army to turn around and proceed to meet Johnston via the Brownsville Road which ran northwest from Edwards to Clinton.  To protect his army during the  retreat, the Confederate commander set up another roadblock, this time to the north along the Middle Road to guard that road's junction with the Jackson Road.  A crucial point, for if there were any Union force bearing westward down the Middle Road, the roadblock could hold it while the Confederate wagons and troops made the critical left-hand turn to access the Brownsville Road.  
          A second Yankee column was discovered around nine that morning by the Confederates manning the roadblock on the Middle Road.  Like the events earlier in the morning, Pemberton's strategy worked and the Yankee's advance was halted there.  If these two columns formed the bulk of the Federal advance, it is possible that Pemberton could escape a fight and unite with Johnston.  However, the realization that a third, much larger Yankee force was on the field changed the entire complexion of the Confederate strategy.  
          Perhaps Pemberton's greatest mistake of the battle of Champion Hill was that he didn't reconnoiter the Jackson Road ­ the main road linking the state capital and Vicksburg ­ to guard against a Union assault from the north.  At about the same time the Yankees were discovered moving along the Middle Road, scouts sent out by Brigadier General Stephen D. Lee returned with the ominous news that a large Federal force was on the Jackson Road.  If Pemberton and the Confederates didn't act to counter this new threat, his army could be attacked in flank while making the left turn at the crossroads.  It was upon hearing that Yankees were converging on him from three avenues of approach that Pemberton decided to ignore Johnston's orders and stay and fight.  The Confederate and Union armies began to deploy for battle.

Contact, May 16