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Rivers' Bridge,
SC
February 2nd and 3rd.: Battle of Rivers' Bridge, Salkehatchie river, South
Carolina. Place: Near present day Ehrhardt, South Carolina. *Earthworks
still well preserved and is a South Carolina State Park. Primary troops
engaged: Confederate: Harrison’s Brigade, McLaw's Division. (approx 1500
Confederates.) 3rd Arkansas Cavalry, Earl's Battery (South Carolina
Palmetto Light Artillery). Union: First Division (Major General Joe
Mower), 17th Corps. First Brigade, 2nd Brigade, Third Brigade. Fourth
Division (Major General Giles Smith). First
Brigade doing most of fighting. The 53rd Indiana of the First brigade and
13th Iowa Infantry of the Third brigade saw slight skirmishing at
Broxton's Bridge.
On the morning of the 2nd of February the Union 17th corps plunged
forward. Its goal, to push through the Salkehatchie River. The 25th
Indiana Infantry had driven Confederate Cavalry before the First Division,
until the gray horsemen had fallen back behind Broxton's bridge. Leaving
the 25th Indiana here to hold the attention of the sizeable Confederate
forces there. The 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry, who would become the
player in at least a half dozen skirmishes in South Carolina, joined the
First Division as the advance. To replace the detached Hoosiers (25th),
the 32nd Wisconsin Infantry was moved to the front of the column of
infantry.
Following the river road, the 9th Illinois drove another detachment of
Confederate cavalry for 3 miles. In one particular charge in this action,
a Lt. Colonel Kirby was wounded. However the johnnies began to resist
rather stubbornly after this point. The Confederate Cavalry became so
defiant as to force the 32nd Wisconsin to be deployed. This duo of the 9th
Illinois and 32nd Wisconsin managed
 to
drive back the roadblock. When the term roadblock is used it is a literal
term. The Confederate cavalry blocking and screening the advance had only
one goal. To detain and delay the advance as long as possible, and to
determine his movements. To block the roads of advance, the Johnnies would
literally fell trees in the road, forming a type of roadblock. Behind
these barricades they would contest the advance, falling back at sight,
however keeping the Union forces screened. For some of Sherman's men this
tactic was one of a desperate enemy. However this notion would be
dispelled for some Union men in only a few hours.
The deadly combo of the Illinoisans and Wisconsin men, proved too much as
the Reb cavalry fell back to the River's bridge/Buford's bridge roads
crossroads. Here two regiments of the Third brigade and the 9th Illinois
were ordered to drive a half-mile up the Buford bridge road and to guard
that approach. In effect securing the immediate left flank of the Federal
column. With the remainder of the First division, Mower pushed to the
right down the River's Bridge road with the 25th Wisconsin as skirmishers.
Their advance was so rapid and complete that the confederates melted,
leaving the 16 bridges across the Salkahatchie River intact. Intact for
the Union juggernaut. This possibly sealed the fate of the Confederate
defenders. With these bridges still remaining across the swollen
swamp/river, possibly as much as a day or more of hard bridging was saved
by the Union.
The Wisconsin skirmishers pushed and at a point where the road angled to
the left, the first report of field pieces filled the swamp. Across the
river, with earthworks for protection, were positioned two confederate
guns. The fire of this small but formidable battery commanded the narrow
causeway through the swamp. At least two of the Unionists fell in the
fire. However the battery was supported by at least some infantry support.
Deploying the skirmishers on either side of the road in the swamp the
union command began to organize their forces. However even as Federal
troops shuffled into position, the Confederate fire continued to harass
their deployment. While the 43rd Ohio was deploying into position, its
Colonel (Colonel Swayne) was struck by a Confederate shell. The rest of
the division, (First and Second brigade) were deployed on the flanks of
the skirmishers. Taking cover in the swollen and flooded swamp, which in
some places was up to 8 feet deep, Mower sized up his option. Guarding the
causeway to cross at River's bridge was two Confederate guns of the
Earle's battery, Palmetto Light Artillery. Their well-maintained works sat
on a bluff overlooking the swamp.
Manning these works was approximately 1500 Confederates, most of
Harrison's brigade of Georgians. Complimenting these forces was a few
other elements of dismounted cavalry. Mower was not the only one who was
impressed by the works. A Confederate Major, when asked of his chances of
holding the position retorted "I can hold this position till Christmas if
you can keep them off my flank". To even reach dry ground to assault these
works the advancing Union troops would have to either brave the hot
concentrated fire on the causeway, or wade through the swollen swamp. All
the while they would be under the constant Confederate fire. However the
swamp, and sheer lack of numbers provided the Achilles heel, or for the
Confederate defenders, Hell, to the position. The confederate defenders
could rather easily hold the main crossings, however they could not guard
every spot. A determined federal party could push through at an unguarded
point, and be relatively safe from view. To counter this the Confederate
Commander, George Harrison, proposed the works at River's bridge being
enclosed on the flanks, and well picketed all along the river. The design
being that once the Federals made their inevitable lodgment on the North
side of the river, the immediate flank would be screened and protected
from a flank attack until reinforcements from Broxton's bridge could be
dispatched.
Feeling the works, and the position too strong to push across frontally,
General Mower pulled all of his men, with the exception of a strong
skirmish line from the swamp and to higher ground. The pioneer troops were
put to work clearing a road through the dense swamp. At times these
forgotten warriors of the Carolina's campaign would slush through water
from two to as much as eight foot deep. Complicating the work was the fact
that the river had been swollen, turning the usually tame and shallow
swamp, into a flooded quagmire. After conferring with 17th Corps commander
Frank Blair, Mower was given the order to push his command across and make
a crossing the next day if possible. In the meantime the bridges through
the swamp were to be built.
As darkness settled over the Salkehatchie the first serious obstacle to
Sherman's march sat ominously. One can only guess what kinds of "picket
chatter" occurred between the 1500 Confederates posted behind the parapets
and the possibly freezing federal skirmishers in the swamp. For the
Confederates the suspense must have been enormous. In front of this small
band of 1500 men sat the army that had just ransacked their home state.
The Georgians must have thought of the reports of Sherman's behavior in
Georgia. The South Carolinians manning the guns and works must have
thought of the homes that were literally at their back. They were all that
stood between Sherman's advance, wherever it may go, and the large part of
South Carolina. The darkness in the swamp must have been near pitch black,
for the men of Sherman's command who picketed it. Beyond the river from
them was obviously a well dug in, and determined force of Confederates.
Would the Confederates make a strong fight, or would they like they had at
Pocatalico, abandon a strong position in the night.
3rd of February
By sunup, Mower's command was at work. Local homes were torn down to
provide planking for the swamp roads while two other separate roads were
being cut through to the river. The purpose being that all three of his
brigades would be able to move on the river on separate roads, which would
put maximum movement and not let the halting of one column stop his whole
command. With the river in front, a confederate attack was not a
possibility. So it would come down the ability to ford the river with his
whole command that would likely tell the tale of the day. The 27th Ohio
Infantry of the First Brigade, commanded by Brig. General John W. Fuller
would cut a road above the road through the swamp to the causeway. Above
this road, detachments from the 25th Wisconsin Infantry and 63rd Ohio
Infantry of the Second Brigade (commanded by Colonel Milton Montgomery)
would also cut a road through the swamp, while the 35th New Jersey were
sent with planks to cover the road. However the bulk of the First and
Second Brigade were to remain at camp, yet ready to support. The Third
Brigade, under command of Colonel John Tillson would man the road through
the swamp approaching the causeway. Of his command the 10th Illinois
Infantry were posted on the right of this road, the 32nd Wisconsin and
25th Indiana posted on the left of it.
For nearly a half mile in their front the Confederate battery commanded
the road. And this was not counting the Confederate muskets, whose owners
sat hidden behind their parapets. For nearly 2 weeks the Confederates had
prepared this position. On a personal note, as a reenactor I have
personally "assaulted these works". And this was from the friendly grassy
landing just below them and not wading through the swamp. My most vivid
memory was the fact that all we could see of the Johnny defenders were
their hats and the puffs of their muskets. Once can only imagine what a
difference 135 years without erosion and the fact of actual minie ball's
whizzing must have done.
Tillson's brigade would soon be sent into action. Under fire of
Confederate rifles, Tillson's men were thrown forward through the heavy
quagmire. Pushing through the swamp for a half of a mile, the Third
brigade halted at the first "branch" of the river. The murky dark water
ran in 3 distinct channels, each too deep and unfordable. Long drawn out
battle lines were useless in the swamp. But so was any attempt as long as
the Confederate battery sat to shell their every move. To alleviate this
Colonel Tillson ordered 15 picked men, from the protection of a rifle pit,
to "keep the heads down of the battery" from 200 yards away. Three
companies of the 32nd Wisconsin were sent forward to advance try to push
across the 3 channels.
With the addition of 3 more companies of the 32nd sent as skirmishers, and
the trusty fire of the "sharpshooters", the skirmishers slugged forward.
Under a hot fire, the Wisconsin men plunged through, sometimes at waist
deep, the cold swamp. Over fallen logs, the skirmishers forced across the
two branches and then at by 12 o’clock they had forced across the final
branch. Lt. Colonel Carleton, in command of the Skirmish line, sent out
the call for more men. About 800 yards above the Confederate position at
River's bridge the skirmishers had crossed the final creek. First the
remaining three companies of the 32nd then the entire 25th Indiana were
sent to exploit the breach.
Upon learning of the breach, Mower, ever the impetuous, hard driving
soldier, ordered his two other Brigades, down the road to the swamp. It is
here that the seeds of a small controversy were watered, pardon the pun.
Upon ordering the First Brigade, under command of General Fuller across to
support the attack, Fuller inquired an aide to Mower as to his
dispositions upon crossing. Was he to align on the left of Tillson?
Although this sounds like a very trivial concern, it would have its
consequences. Fuller was informed to "use his own judgment" yet that Mower
would be crossed shortly and that he wanted the enemy driven as rapidly as
possible.
Meanwhile back at the bridge the 10th Illinois remained. Mower gave their
captain, feeling he could force a crossing to the right of the causeway,
the green light. The goal being to divert the confederate response to
Tillson's flanking force. Only two companies of the 10th were able to
cross before heavy Secessionist fire halted them. However the Illinoisans
would not give their earned ground. Mower ordered the commander of the
10th Illinois, Captain Gillespie, to not try to force the rest of his
command across, but to keep up a fire and a show of force. Upon hearing
heavy firing to the left of their position, the Illinoisans would press
again, and once again try to drive the position.
With the 10th's diversion stopped in its tracks, elements of Montgomery's
(second brigade) were thrown directly up the causeway. Under fire from the
battery, the 43rd Ohio Infantry and 3 companies of the 63rd Ohio were
thrown forward However the fire once again was too heavy for the buckeyes
just as it had been for the Illinoisans. With the their attempt to carry
the works directly up the causeway halted by johnny fire, the rest of the
63rd Ohio and the 25th Wisconsin were thus ordered to support the original
breach by the Third brigade on the left.
Upon the crossing of the Third brigade to support the 32nd Wisconsin's
breach, Fuller (First brigade) was ordered to support also. After the
"diversions", Montgomery's brigade was added to the mix. As the Third
brigade reinforcements plodded through the swamp, they formed with the
25th Indiana and a part of the 32nd Wisconsin's skirmishers to form a
battle line. Two 100-yard advances later, all the while under confederate
fire; the skirmish line was forced to be rebolstered by a company of the
25th Indiana. However the johnny skirmishers were giving ground, falling
back before Tillson's command.
At this time Fuller arrived with his First brigade. Being superior in rank
to Tillson, he ordered Tillson's advance stopped while he dressed his
brigade on Tillson's flank. Hearing of dry land ahead, and a reported
order from Mower to advance, Tillson pushed his brigade forward instead.
Emerging from the swamp and driving steadily forward through an open
field, Tillson's Federals slowly overpowered their Confederate
adversaries. However by this time the main Rebel forces holding the
redoubt at the River's Bridge works were wise to the Federals foray. As
Federal troops began their advance on the flank of the River's Bridge
works, the outnumbered Confederates were ordered into a well-earned
retreat. Their chief goal of holding their position until nightfall being
nearly obtained, the Confederate infantry and battery fired heavy volleys,
and then retired from the field behind the smokescreen.
At this time Fuller was attempting to form all three brigades across the
river into line. Tillson's advance however had outdistanced his own, so
Fuller was forced to advance with his own brigade without neither
Montgomery nor Tillson to cooperate in a solid battle line. Fuller's plan
was solid, he wished to use the left of his anticipated line (Montgomery)
to swing in a right wheel and cut off the retreat route of the Johnnies.
However his delay in trying to link up the entire command had possibly
allowed the orderly retreat of the Confederates. Fuller pushed forward
until abreast of Tillson, and after waiting for the arrival of the Second
brigade, the left of the line pushed to the rear of the works. However the
works were guarded now only by empty air, and the familiar, mud soaked men
of the 10th Illinois. The two companies, who had earlier pushed forward,
had seized the works after the withdrawal of its occupants. Almost
fittingly the works were gained just as night was coming.
The fight for River's Bridge had been bloody. by small skirmish standards.
Eight confederates were left KIA, 45 wounded and 44 captured. Union total
casualties were 16 KIA, 85 wounded. Tillson's brigade suffered 1 officer
KIA, 2 wounded, 8 men KIA, 74 wounded. Fuller lost 7 of the 39th Ohio
wounded, 1 of 18th Missouri wounded. Montgomery lost in the 43rd Ohio, 6
KIA, 8 wounded; Sixty-third Ohio, 9 wounded (3 since died). Total loss of
Montgomery's brigade in the two days, 9 killed and 23 wounded; total, 32.
An confederate stand however would have been doomed ever since 5 o’clock
that afternoon, when Giles Smith's division crossed over, and through
their crossing cutting off any hope of reinforcements from Broxton's
bridge. This Crossing was in between River's and Broxton's Bridge. |
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